News · Commonwealth criminal law

Online threats to a public official.

On 6 August 2026 the AFP announced that a Bankstown man had been sentenced at Bankstown Local Court over online threats to a federal parliamentarian. He was found guilty of using a carriage service to threaten to kill, under section 474.15(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth), and received a community corrections order and a $5,000 fine. This note sets out the law that applies when a message sent online becomes a criminal charge.

By · Published 7 August 2026

The case in summary.

The AFP set up National Security Investigations teams in late 2025 to look at threats and harassment directed at federal parliamentarians. Several charges have followed. The most recent to reach a result was reported on 6 August 2026. Two emails sent to a parliamentarian's office threatened to kill the member and their family. They were traced back to a Bankstown residence. The man was found guilty of using a carriage service to threaten to kill under section 474.15(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) and sentenced to a community corrections order and a $5,000 fine.

The charge is a Commonwealth one because the conduct used a telecommunications service. That single fact, the use of a phone, an email account, or a social media platform, moves the offence out of state law and into the federal Criminal Code. The same emails, if hand-delivered, would attract state charges. Sent online, they are federal.

This is a note on the law, not on any person. It explains what the carriage service offences require the prosecution to prove, how a threat charge differs from a menace charge, the penalties, and the defences that are run.

Is it a crime to send threatening or abusive messages online in Australia?

Yes. Two offences do most of the work. The first is section 474.17 of the Criminal Code (Cth), using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence. The maximum is five years. It covers abusive, intimidating or offensive messages of a kind a reasonable person would regard as menacing, harassing or offensive.

The second is section 474.15, using a carriage service to make a threat. A threat to kill carries a maximum of ten years. A threat to cause serious harm carries a maximum of seven years. The prosecution must prove the accused intended the recipient to fear the threat would be carried out, or was reckless as to that fear. These two sections are the charges the AFP reaches for when a message crosses the line from unpleasant to threatening.

A "carriage service" is defined in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) as a service for carrying communications by electromagnetic energy. In plain terms, that means a phone call, an SMS, an email, a direct message, a social media post, or a message on any online platform. The offences are not limited to any one app. Any message sent over a network is caught.

What does "using a carriage service to menace, harass or cause offence" mean?

Section 474.17 is judged by a reasonable person standard. The test is not whether the accused meant to menace or offend, and it is not whether the actual recipient was menaced or offended. The test is whether reasonable persons would regard the conduct as menacing, harassing or offensive in all the circumstances. The court looks at the words, the context, the relationship between the parties, and the number and pattern of the messages.

"Menacing" sits at the serious end. It suggests a threat of detriment. "Harassing" covers repeated conduct that troubles or torments. "Offensive" is the lowest bar, though the courts have said the content must be seriously or significantly offensive, not merely rude or in poor taste. A single angry message will not always meet the standard. A sustained campaign of messages usually will.

The section applies to public figures and private individuals alike. A politician, a public servant, a journalist, an ex-partner, or a stranger can each be the target. The status of the recipient can raise the objective seriousness at sentence, but it is not an element of the offence.

What is the difference between section 474.15 and section 474.17?

Section 474.15 is the threat offence. It applies where the message contains a threat to kill or a threat to cause serious harm. Section 474.17 is the menace and harassment offence. It applies to abusive or intimidating conduct that does not contain a threat to kill or seriously harm.

The distinction decides the maximum penalty and often the court. A threat to kill under section 474.15 carries ten years and is a serious indictable matter. A single menace charge under section 474.17 carries five years and is frequently dealt with in the Local Court. The prosecution chooses the charge on the content of the message. A message that says "I will kill you" is a threat. A message that is a torrent of abuse, without a threat to kill or seriously harm, is a menace.

Do prosecutors have to prove the victim actually feared the threat?

No. Section 474.15 says in terms that it is not necessary to prove that the person threatened actually feared the threat would be carried out. The offence is complete when the threat is made with the required intention. A recipient who shrugs off the message, or never reads it, does not save the sender. This is a common misunderstanding. People assume that because the target was unmoved, there is no offence. The law does not work that way.

What the prosecution must prove is the mental element: that the accused intended the recipient to fear the threat would be carried out, or was reckless about that. The focus is on the accused's state of mind and the objective content of the message, not on the recipient's reaction.

Is threatening a politician or public official a separate offence?

There is a separate offence, though it is not always the one charged. Section 147.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth) makes it an offence to threaten to cause harm to a Commonwealth public official, where the threat is made because of the official's status or duties. The maximum is nine years where the threat is to cause serious harm to a judicial officer, a law enforcement officer or a frontline worker, and seven years in other serious-harm cases. A member of parliament is a Commonwealth public official.

In practice, the AFP most often charges the carriage service offences, because almost every threat now arrives by email, phone or social media. The carriage service charge does not require the target to hold any office. It captures the same conduct with a clean set of elements. Where the threat is tied to the official's public role, section 147.2 may be laid as well or instead.

State law also has a place. Stalking or intimidation under section 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) can apply to a course of online conduct intended to cause fear. Where the conduct spans both a carriage service and offline behaviour, state and federal charges can run together.

Can you go to jail for sending threatening emails?

Jail is available and is imposed in serious cases. The maximum for a threat to kill is ten years. But the maximum is reserved for the worst category of offending, and most cases sit well below it. The sentence turns on the content and number of the messages, whether the conduct was sustained or a single lapse, the effect on the target, the offender's prior record, and the offender's mental health.

The Bankstown result reported this week, a community corrections order and a $5,000 fine for a threat to kill, sits at the lower end. That outcome tends to reflect a single episode, an early acceptance of responsibility, and strong subjective material. At the other end, a person who runs a sustained campaign of threats against a public figure, or who has prior convictions of the same kind, faces full-time custody. General deterrence weighs heavily where the target holds public office, because the courts treat threats that chill public service as an attack on the office as much as the person.

What are the defences?

Several run, depending on the facts. The first is the reasonable person test itself. On a section 474.17 charge, the defence can argue that the content, read in context, would not be menacing, harassing or offensive to reasonable persons. On a section 474.15 charge, the defence can argue there was no threat, or no threat to kill or cause serious harm as distinct from angry hyperbole.

Authorship is often the real issue. The prosecution has to prove the accused sent the message. Shared devices, spoofed accounts, and open networks all raise a genuine question of who was at the keyboard. The phone download, the account records, and the IP data are tested closely.

Mental health is relevant in two ways: to intention, where a cognitive impairment or acute illness bears on whether the accused meant to threaten, and to sentence, where it can reduce moral culpability and change the type of penalty. The implied freedom of political communication was argued in Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92, where offensive letters were sent to families of soldiers killed in action. The High Court split evenly and the convictions stood. The freedom is a narrow constitutional argument about the validity of the law, not a general defence that abuse of a politician is protected speech.

How these matters are run.

The work starts with the brief. The core documents are the messages themselves, the account and device records that link the accused to them, and the record of any search warrant executed on the home. Each is tested. Where authorship is arguable, that is the fight. Where authorship is not in issue, the case usually turns on the characterisation of the content and on sentence.

On a plea, the subjective case does the heavy lifting. Prior good character, a psychological report that explains the conduct, genuine remorse, and steps taken since the offence all bear on whether the court imposes a fine and a community-based order or a term of imprisonment. A guilty plea entered early attracts a discount for its utilitarian value. These matters reward early, careful advice, because the difference between a fine and a criminal record with jail can rest on how the case is prepared from the first mention.

Frequently asked.

Is it a crime to send threatening or abusive messages online in Australia?

Yes. A threatening, menacing or harassing message sent by email, text or social media can be charged under section 474.17 of the Criminal Code (Cth), with a maximum of five years. A threat to kill or to cause serious harm is charged under section 474.15, with a maximum of ten years for a threat to kill.

What is the difference between section 474.15 and section 474.17?

Section 474.15 covers a threat to kill or to cause serious harm. Section 474.17 covers menacing, harassing or offensive conduct that stops short of such a threat. A threat is charged under 474.15; abuse or intimidation without a threat to kill or seriously harm is charged under 474.17.

Do prosecutors have to prove the victim actually feared the threat?

No. Section 474.15 says it is not necessary to prove that the person threatened feared the threat would be carried out. The offence turns on the making of the threat with the required intention, not on the recipient's reaction.

Is threatening a politician or public official a separate offence?

It can be. Threatening to cause harm to a Commonwealth public official because of their status is an offence under section 147.2 of the Criminal Code (Cth). The carriage service offences in sections 474.15 and 474.17 apply to threats against anyone and are the charges the AFP most often uses for online threats.

Can you go to jail for sending threatening emails?

Yes, jail is available and is imposed in serious cases. The maximum for a threat to kill is ten years. Not every case ends in full-time custody; outcomes range from a fine and a community corrections order for a single message to imprisonment for repeated or targeted threats.

What are the defences to a carriage service menace or threat charge?

That the content would not be menacing, harassing or offensive to a reasonable person; that there was no threat; that the accused was not the author or sender; and mental health considerations relevant to intention and to sentence. The implied freedom of political communication argued in Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 is a narrow constitutional argument, not a general defence.

Primary sources: the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (sections 474.15, 474.17 and 147.2), the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) (definition of carriage service), and Monis v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 92 on JADE.

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To speak to a criminal defence lawyer, call Aaron Kernaghan on 0421 717 019.

This article is written by , criminal defence lawyer at Good Legal Lawyers, as at 7 August 2026. It is commentary and reflects the personal opinion of the author only. It is not legal advice, it is not a substitute for advice on your own matter, and it does not purport to be accurate or complete. Any matter referred to may be before the court and any person charged is presumed innocent. For advice on a specific matter, contact Aaron Kernaghan on 0421 717 019 or contact the firm.

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