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KF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWCCA 79.

On 18 June 2026 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held that an adult found act proven but not criminally responsible of a registrable child sex offence must be made a registrable person, although he was never convicted, was not detained, and was released on conditions. Leeming JA, Ball JA and N Adams CJ at CL.

By · Published 27 October 2026

The decision.

KF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWCCA 79 was decided on 18 June 2026. A person found ‘act proven but not criminally responsible’ of a registrable child sex offence must be made a registrable person under section 3C(1) of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) if he was an adult when the offence was committed. That is so when he has not been convicted, has not been detained, and has been released on conditions.

Leeming JA gave the leading judgment. Ball JA and N Adams CJ at CL agreed (Leeming JA at [34]–[42], [48]–[57]; Ball JA at [61]; N Adams CJ at CL at [62]). The Court was constituted as both the Court of Criminal Appeal and the Court of Appeal. The appeal was dismissed after leave and an extension of time were granted, and the summons in the Court of Appeal was dismissed.

The Court did not adopt the primary judge’s reasoning that the conditions of release made the order a penalty. Leeming JA held that the penalty question did not matter. What mattered was whether the order followed a finding of guilt, including a deemed finding, and whether it was a ‘no conviction order’.

Key points.

  • A special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible is a deemed finding of guilt for the purposes of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW): section 2B(2)(e).
  • For a person who was an adult at the time of the offence, a registrable person order is mandatory once the court imposes a ‘sentence’ for a registrable offence, other than a no conviction order: section 3C(1)(a).
  • ‘Sentence’ in that Act covers all orders made after a finding of guilt, including a deemed finding, unless the order is a no conviction order.
  • A conditional release order under section 33(1)(c) of the Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) falls inside that definition. Detention is not required.
  • The exclusion is confined to the two orders listed in section 3C(4): an order under section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), and an order under section 33(1)(a) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW).
  • A person who was a child at the time of the offence is dealt with differently. The order is discretionary and depends on a request from the prosecution: section 3C(1)(b).

The facts.

KF is 78 and has dementia. On 5 December 2024, after a fitness hearing in the District Court, he was found unfit to be tried on a number of charges of sexual offending against a child. The charges included sexual touching offences and sexual intercourse with a child. On 12 June 2025, after a special hearing, special verdicts were returned under section 59(1)(b) of the Forensic Provisions Act that the acts were proven but that KF was not criminally responsible.

On 17 October 2025 the primary judge, Priestley SC DCJ, ordered KF’s conditional release under section 33(1)(c). KF had been on bail until then. The evidence was uncontested that his dementia was associated with disinhibition, that he had no history of offending before the charged conduct, that his cognitive deficits had contributed to the offending, and that there had been no suggestion of further offending in the two and a half years after the last charged event. The conditions included medication, ongoing medical treatment, and a condition that he not be in the presence of a child under 18 without another adult present.

On 7 November 2025, on the Director’s application, the primary judge made a registrable person order: R v KF [2025] NSWDC 457. KF challenged that order. His only ground was that a conditional release order was not a ‘sentence’ for the purposes of section 3C(1), so the power to make a registrable person order was never engaged.

The complainant’s identity is protected by a statutory non-publication order under section 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The judgment refers to the appellant as KF and omits most details of the offending. This note does the same.

How the registration scheme works.

The Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) sets up a scheme for the registration of, and reporting by, people who have committed certain offences against children. Section 2A states its objects: to protect children from serious harm, to ensure early detection of offences by recidivist child sex offenders, to monitor registrable persons, and to ensure they comply with the Act.

Section 3C(1) imposes the duty to make a registrable person order. For a person who was an adult when the offence was committed, the order is mandatory if the court imposes a sentence for the registrable offence, other than a no conviction order. For a person who was a child, the order requires a request from the prosecution and a finding that the order is necessary because the person poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children generally. Section 3C(3) requires the order to specify the reporting period, which is worked out under section 3I.

Two definitions drive the case.

  • No conviction order. Section 3C(4) says this means an order under section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) or section 33(1)(a) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW). The definition is exhaustive.
  • Sentence. Section 2B(1) says ‘sentence’ includes several listed orders. The first is any order under section 65(2) of the Forensic Provisions Act that keeps a person in custody, or an order of detention under section 33(1) or 61(2) of that Act. The others are any order under section 33(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act, any action taken under section 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, an undertaking under section 23 of the Pre-Trial Diversion of Offenders Act 1985 (NSW), and sentences or equivalent orders imposed under foreign law.

Section 2B(2)(e) completes the picture. For the purposes of the Act, a reference to a finding of guilt includes a verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible under the Forensic Provisions Act.

What KF argued.

There were two strands.

The first was about purpose. Community safety, KF said, is already dealt with by the Forensic Provisions Act. A court cannot release a person after a special verdict unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the safety of the person or of any member of the public will not be seriously endangered: section 33(3). A registrable person order added nothing.

The second was about text. The first limb of the definition of ‘sentence’ picks up only custody and detention orders under the Forensic Provisions Act. KF said that was a deliberate choice, and that orders which leave a cognitively impaired person at liberty fall outside the definition. He also said orders made to protect the community and the person are not punishment, so they are not sentences in any ordinary sense.

Why the Court rejected both strands.

Leeming JA started from the text and found five reasons that point the same way. Each is a reason to read ‘sentence’ widely.

The definition already includes the most lenient orders.

Any order under section 33(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) is a ‘sentence’. That covers dismissing the charge, with or without a caution, and discharging the person on a good behaviour bond. Any action under section 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), which is a conviction with no other penalty, is also a ‘sentence’. Neither of those imposes any restriction on liberty. KF’s argument that only deprivations of liberty count could not be squared with them.

The no conviction exclusion shows how wide the definition is.

An order under section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) is excluded as a no conviction order. Leeming JA reasoned that it would not need to be excluded unless it would otherwise be a ‘sentence’. The only difference between section 10 and section 10A is that the first is made without a conviction and the second with one. On the text, section 33(1)(a) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act is both a ‘sentence’ and a no conviction order. KF’s submission that the express exclusion limited the definition was rejected, because it would leave half of the exhaustive definition of ‘no conviction order’ with nothing to do.

Conviction is not the touchstone.

Leeming JA noted that one meaning of ‘sentence’ in the ordinary criminal law is a definitive decision about the consequences of a conviction. That reasoning works for the section 10 and section 10A comparison. It does not carry across to the Forensic Provisions Act, which does not involve convictions. Yet the first limb of the definition expressly takes in custodial orders made under that Act. Conviction therefore cannot be the criterion.

The deeming provision does the rest.

Section 2B(2)(e) deems a special verdict to be a finding of guilt for the purposes of the Act. Once that is accepted, the test becomes a short one. A ‘sentence’ includes all orders made after a finding of guilt, including a deemed finding. Unless the order is a no conviction order, the power and the duty in section 3C(1) are engaged for an adult.

Purpose and incongruity.

The Court said there is no warrant to exclude cognitively impaired people who, but for their impairment, would be convicted sex offenders. They are less morally culpable than a person fit to stand trial. They may still present exactly the danger to children that the Act exists to address.

The Court also found the alternative result most incongruous. A person convicted of a registrable offence and dealt with under section 10A, with no other penalty, is made a registrable person. A person released into the community on stringent conditions after a special verdict, on a finding that public safety will not be seriously endangered, would escape. The section 33(3) finding was not an answer, because the line the Act draws leaves only a very narrow class outside the order.

The Director had also taken the Court through the legislative history of both Acts. Leeming JA recorded that, on the Director’s own submission, the Minister introducing amending legislation had on at least two occasions misapprehended how the two regimes fit together. He did not summarise that history. Two points did emerge from it. The treatment of section 33(1) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act has been consistent since 2000. And the exceptions to registration have shrunk over a quarter of a century. For example, the 2007 amendments removed the exception for people sentenced to periodic detention, home detention, community service, or a bond for a single Class 2 offence. Neither point helped KF.

Why this matters.

First. Registration follows the special verdict, not the form of order.

The decision rejects the argument that a non-custodial outcome after a special verdict keeps the person out of the registration scheme. A court that releases an adult on conditions after a special verdict on a registrable offence must make the order. So must a court that makes any other order that is not a no conviction order. The judgment identifies no order available under the Forensic Provisions Act that falls within the section 3C(4) exclusion.

Second. Advice at the fitness and special hearing stage should cover registration.

A special verdict is a protective outcome and no conviction is recorded. The Forensic Provisions Act does not treat it as a finding of guilt. The registration Act does. A person with a cognitive impairment, their family, any guardian or substitute decision-maker, and the treating team should each be told before the special hearing that the verdict, if returned, carries registration and reporting obligations for an adult, in addition to the forensic consequences under the Forensic Provisions Act.

Third. The points that stay open.

A mandatory order still depends on its pre-conditions. Whether the offence is a registrable offence, whether the person was an adult when it was committed, and the correct reporting period under section 3I all remain live. If the person was a child at the time, the discretion in section 3C(1)(b) is unaffected, and it depends on a request from the prosecution and a finding about risk to children.

Fourth. The appeal pathway.

It was common ground that a section 3C order is an interlocutory order for the purposes of section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), following Rodden v R (2023) 112 NSWLR 162. An appeal therefore needs leave and, here, a short extension of time. KF also filed a summons for judicial review in the Court of Appeal under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW). Leeming JA left the question of the Court of Criminal Appeal’s jurisdiction undecided. He constituted the Court as both courts and made the same orders in each. A practitioner challenging a section 3C order should assume that both routes need to be protected until the question is decided.

Fifth. What the case does not decide.

KF was released on conditions. The reasoning is framed in terms of any order after a finding of guilt that is not a no conviction order, so on its terms it is not confined to conditional release. The Court was not asked about unconditional release, and I read the reasoning as reaching it, but that point has not been decided. The jurisdictional question described above is also open.

If a family member or client is facing a fitness hearing or a special hearing on a sexual offence, the registration consequences should be mapped at the outset. Our notes on fitness to be tried and the special verdict in NSW and on forensic patients and extension orders cover the other consequences of the same pathway.

About this report.

The judgment is available on NSW Caselaw: KF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWCCA 79. The hearing was on 2 June 2026. B Cochrane appeared for KF. D Kell SC and M Pulsford appeared for the Director. The version on NSW Caselaw was updated on 26 October 2026 to correct one word at [52].

Frequently asked.

What is a registrable person order?

It is an order under section 3C of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW) that a person is a registrable person. The person becomes subject to the Act's registration and reporting scheme for the reporting period the order specifies, which is calculated under section 3I.

Is a special verdict of act proven but not criminally responsible a conviction?

No. The Mental Health and Cognitive Impairment Forensic Provisions Act 2020 (NSW) does not treat the verdict as a finding of guilt, and no conviction is recorded. For the purposes of the Child Protection (Offenders Registration) Act, however, section 2B(2)(e) treats the verdict as a finding of guilt.

Does release on conditions avoid a registrable person order?

No. In KF v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2026] NSWCCA 79 the Court of Criminal Appeal held that a conditional release order under section 33(1)(c) of the Forensic Provisions Act is a sentence for the purposes of section 3C(1), so the order was mandatory for an adult.

Which orders avoid a registrable person order?

Only a no conviction order. Section 3C(4) defines that as an order under section 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) or section 33(1)(a) of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW).

Does the same rule apply to a person who was a child when the offence was committed?

No. Under section 3C(1)(b) the prosecution must request the order, and the court must be satisfied that it is necessary because the person poses a risk to the lives or sexual safety of one or more children, or of children generally.

Can a registrable person order be appealed?

It was common ground in KF that a section 3C order is an interlocutory order for the purposes of section 5F of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), so an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal needs leave. KF also sought judicial review in the Court of Appeal. The Court left the jurisdictional question open.

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This article is written by , criminal defence lawyer at Brady & Associates Lawyers, as at 27 October 2026. It is commentary and reflects the personal opinion of the author only. It is not legal advice, it is not a substitute for advice on your own matter, and it does not purport to be accurate or complete. Any matter referred to may be before the court and any person charged is presumed innocent. For advice on a specific matter, contact Aaron Kernaghan on 0421 717 019 or contact the firm.

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